

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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P R 301757Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6579

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 10814

EXDIS NOFORN

USNMR SHAPE FOR INTAF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW, US, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INITIAL FRG FOREIGN OFFICE REACTION TO
US MBFR PAPER.

REF: A. STATE 146712, B. STATE 148466, C. USNATO 3582

SUMMARY: INITIAL FONOFF REACTION TO JULY 27 US POSITION
PAPER ON MBFR HAS BEEN HIGHLY POSITIVE. FONOFF
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT CHIEF RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT FRG
COULD WORK WELL WITHIN FRAMEWORK PROPOSED BY US. RUTH
ACCORDED PARTICULAR PRAISE TO PHASED COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR
SOLUTION OF STATIONED/INDIGENOUS REDUCTION ISSUE. RUTH
ALSO CONCURRED IN DEFERRING DEFINITION OF MBFR-II
FORCE REDUCTION COMPOSITION, AND VOICED GENERAL APPROVAL
OF US PROPOSALS ON TACNUCS AND CONSTRAINTS. HE ALSO
ALSO AGREED THAT FURTHER NATO DISCUSSION OF GUIDELINES
PAPER SHOULD BE SUBORDINATED TO PRIOR CONSIDERATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES. WE WILL CHECK OUT DEFENSE
MINISTRY REACTIONS TO US PAPER LATER THIS WEEK.
END SUMMARY.

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1. GENERAL. RUTH HAS GIVEN EMBOFF INITIAL HIGHLY POSITIVE REACTION TO US MBFR POSITION PAPER, WHICH HE THINKS COULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR EXPEDITIOUS WESTERN ACCORD ON MBFR NEGOTIATION POSTURE. RUTH SAID CONCRETE END GOAL OF TEN PER CENT NATO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CONTEXT OF COMMON CEILING CONCEPT SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE BOTH TO PUBLIC OPINION AND TO THE EAST. MORE IMPORTANTLY, RELATING OF EASTERN AND WESTERN FORCE LEVELS THROUGH COMMON CEILING CONCEPT COULD PROVIDE CONVINCING RATIONALE TO WESTERN PARLIAMENTARIANS SKEPTICAL OF MBFR PROJECT. IN ADDITION, RUTH SAID NOTION OF EQUALITY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL VIS-A-VIS WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATORS AND, INTERNALLY, WITH AND FOR DEFENSE MINISTRIES.

2. REDUCTION COMPONENT AND COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT US FORMULATION OF COMMON CEILING CONCEPT COULD SUBSUME INTERNAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT DISPUTE ON STATIONED/INDIGENOUS REDUCTION. THIS IS BECAUSE THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCE OF A SECOND NEGOTIATION PHASE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE INDIGENOUS FORCES, AND WOULD ALSO GIVE INDICATION OF EXTENT OF MBFR-II REDUCTIONS--I.E., THOSE REMAINING EASTERN AND WESTERN FORCE REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH RESPECTIVE 704,000 CEILINGS.

3. MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS. RUTH ALSO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR US POSITION THAT COMPOSITION OF WESTERN NATIONAL FORCES IN MBFR-II REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED UNTIL INITIAL REDUCTION SCHEME BEGINS TO EMERGE FROM MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS. RUTH NOTED US ASSUMPTION THAT EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF NATO REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE (REF C, PARA 14). HE ALSO EXPRESSED PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, THAT LEAVING MBFR-II COMPOSITION UNDEFINED AT THIS TIME WOULD MAXIMIZE ALLIED USES OF MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENTS. WHILE RUTH THOUGHT FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY WOULD DESIRE FIRMEST POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO MBFR NEGOTIATION PHASES, HE REITERATED HIS JUDGEMENT THAT BINDING COMMITMENT

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TO SECOND NEGOTIATION PHASE AND LIKELY SIGNIFICANT BUNDESWEHR PARTICIPATION IN 49,000 MAN MBFR-II NATO REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ENOUGH TO SATISFY DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER. RUTH ADDED THAT THIS APPROACH TO MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS ALSO HAD THE ADVANTAGES THAT GERMAN FORCES WERE NOT SINGLED OUT AND THAT FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS COULD BE EXPECTED, PURSUANT TO COMMON CEILING APPROACH, IN MBFR-II.

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6580

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43. EMBOFF OFFERED THE VIEW THAT SOVIET INTEREST IN BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS TOGETHER WITH LIKELY PUBLIC DEMAND FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LIKELY TO LEAD SOVIETS TO ACCEPT SECOND MBFR NEGOTIATION PHASE. EMBOFF ADDED THAT SETTING ASIDE ISSUE OF MBFR-II WESTERN FORCE REDUCTION COMPOSITION COULD BOTH AVOID INTERNECINE ALLIED DISPUTES AND COULD SERVE TO FOCUS ALLIED ATTENTION WHERE IT BELONGS, ON MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS. RUTH TERMED THIS APPROACH "AN EXCEEDINGLY GOOD IDEA", ADDING THAT CONCRETE END GOAL WAS IN HIS VIEW VERY IMPORTANT.

5. NEGOTIATING TACTICS. RUTH SAID HE SHARED US JUDGEMENT THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE UNLIKELY, AT LEAST AT EARLY POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS, TO PROVIDE ACCURATE FIGURES ON SOVIET GROUND FORCE LEVELS WITHIN NATO GUIDELINES AREA. HE THEREFORE EXPRESSED APPROBATION FOR US TACTICAL APPROACH OF DEFINING COMMON CEILING OF 704,000 FORCES AS END GOAL FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS APPROACH, ADDED RUTH, WOULD PUT THE BURDEN ON THE SOVIETS TO WIN WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF TRUE SOVIET FORCE FIGURES.

6. TANK/TACNUC MIXED PACKAGE. RECALLING VIEWS PUT TO
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US LAST JANUARY BY DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH (BONN 168), RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT CAUTIOUS US APPROACH ON SUPPLEMENTARY TANK/TACNUC MIXED PACKAGE WOULD WIN SUPPORT IN BONN. IN CONTEXT OF ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR WESTERN NEGOTIATION POSITION, RUTH DID HOWEVER EXPRESS CONCERN OVER JULY 25 FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE REPORT (DPA DISPATCH FROM BRUSSELS) SAYING WASHINGTON WOULD OFFER REDUCTION OF US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN RETURN FOR REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WP WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY SOVIET TANKS.

7. CONSTRAINTS. RUTH SAID HE COULD FIND LITTLE IN THE US PROPOSALS ON PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND CONSTRAINTS WITH WHICH HE COULD NOT AGREE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH PROPOSAL FOR PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO REPEAT INTO THE AREA, A LONG STANDING FRG DISEDERATUM. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN THAT CONSTRAINTS WOULD APPLY TO GEOGRAPHIC AREA WIDER THAN REDUCTION AREA AS IT WOULD ALSO AFFECT APPROACHES TO REDUCTION AREA. FINALLY, SHOULD SATISFACTORY PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENT PROVE ATTAINABLE, RUTH SAID FRG CONTINUED TO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR POLITICAL PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES TO ACCORD SUCH AN AGREEMENT A CATCHY TITLE SUCH AS "AGREEMENT ON MISCALCULATION IN EUROPE" (BONN 9440 PARA 5).

8. VERIFICATION. RUTH REITERATED FRG UNDERSTANDING FOR US POSITION THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SHOULD BE ESSENTIAL BASIS OF MBFR VERIFICATION. BUTRUTH ALSO RECALLED ROTH'S EARLIER THINKING ON POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTARY MBFR VERIFICATION THROUGH A STANDING COMMITTEE (BONN 9440 PARA 4), SAYING THIS APPROACH COULD BE RELATIVELY LOOSE AND INFORMAL.

9. FORTHCOMING NATO CONSULTATIONS. EMBOFF DREW ON GUIDANCE IN STATE 145663 IN URGING THAT FRG SUPPORT PRIORITY EMPHASIS IN FORTHCOMING ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME WITH CONSIDERATION OF NATO GUIDELINES PAPER AND MBFR NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES TO COME THEREAFTER. RUTH SAID HE AGREED TO THIS APPROACH
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AND ALSO TO USE OF JULY 27 US PAPER AS BASIS FOR
UPCOMING ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. RUTH ALSO
CONCURRED WITH GUIDANCE IN STATE 145663 PARA 4 TO THE
EFFECT THAT AGENDA DEBATE AT VIENNA SHOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED TO HOLD UP TIMELY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.
BUT RUTH ADDED THAT THE WEST SHOULD USE AGENDA
DISCUSSION AT THE OUTSET OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO
ESTABLISH THE BASIS OF WESTERN POSITIONS AND TO PROBE
ON SOVIET ATTITUDES.

10. COMMENT; IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ABOVE
REPRESENTS THE INITIAL REACTION OF KEY FONOFF WORKING
LEVEL OFFICIAL TO US MBFR PAPER. WE WILL CHECK ON
DEFENSE MINISTRY VIEWS LATER THIS WEEK, AFTER DEFMIN
OFFICIALS HAVE HAD A FIRST RUN-THROUGH THE PAPER.
HILLENBRAND

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